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THE RACE HORSE THAT
WOULDN’T DIE:
ON HERRERA V. WYOMING
BENJAMIN CANTOR*
INTRODUCTION
Should Native Americans be able to reclaim the hunting right
guaranteed to them by an 1868 treaty based on advantageous
developments in how the Supreme Court interprets such treaties? Or
should past precedents denying that right deprive them of a chance to
re-litigate the issue? In Herrera v. Wyoming,1 the Supreme Court is
considering how to reconcile the Crow Tribe’s hunting right with
Wyoming’s sovereignty. This endeavor requires examining nineteenthcentury treaties and precedents to decipher the intents of the Crow
Tribe and the United States government. If the Court’s decision
includes a clear articulation of whether Native American treaty rights
may be truncated by mere implication, tribes nationwide may be at
risk of losing treaty rights they have enjoyed for centuries.
In making its decision, the Supreme Court will also have to weigh
the advantages and disadvantages of overturning precedent and of
undermining its underlying rationale. In this Commentary, I argue
that the lower courts erred in applying issue preclusion and in relying
on the outdated Race Horse doctrine.
I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Facts
Clayvin Herrera is an enrolled member of the Crow Tribe of
Indians; he lives on the Crow Reservation in St. Xavier, Montana.2
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1. Herrera v. Wyoming, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (NO. 17-532) (2018).
2. Joint Appendix at 185, Herrera v. Wyoming, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (2018) (NO. 17-532), 2018
WL 4928044, at *185 [hereinafter Joint Appendix].
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Herrera and other Tribe members went hunting on the Crow
Reservation in January 2014.3 While pursuing a herd of elk, Herrera
and his companions left the Crow Reservation and crossed into
Wyoming’s Bighorn National Forest, where they shot three elk.4 The
party then returned to the Reservation with the meat.5 Herrera was
cited for two criminal misdemeanors: one for taking an antlered big
game animal without a license or during a closed season, and the
other for being an accessory to the same offense.6
B. Procedural History
In July 2015, Herrera filed a motion to dismiss with the Wyoming
Circuit Court, arguing that he had a right to hunt off the Reservation
under Article Four of the Second Treaty of Fort Laramie, a treaty
between the Crow Tribe and the United States.7 The Court denied the
motion, reasoning that the Crow Tribe did not have an off-reservation
treaty hunting right pursuant to the Tenth Circuit’s holding in Repsis.8
The Wyoming Supreme Court denied Herrera’s petition for review in
November 2015, and the Wyoming District Court dismissed his
interlocutory appeal in April 2016.9 Both the Wyoming Supreme
Court and the United States Supreme Court denied Herrera’s
requests for a stay.10
At trial in April 2016, a jury convicted Herrera of both
misdemeanor charges.11 Herrera appealed to the district court,
contesting the circuit court’s pretrial decision on the treaty right’s
validity.12 The district court affirmed the conviction.13 Herrera next
filed a petition for review with the Wyoming Supreme Court, which
denied review without explanation.14 The United States Supreme
Court then granted certiorari.15

3. Id.
4. Id. at *186.
5. Id.
6. Id. at *255 (citing WYO. STAT. ANN. § 23-3-102(d), 23-6-205 (2018)).
7. Brief for Petitioner at 14, Herrera v. Wyoming, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (2018) (NO. 17-532),
2018 WL 4293381, at *14 [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner].
8. Id.
9. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 7, at *15.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at *16.
14. Id. at *17.
15. Wyoming, 138 S. Ct. 2707.
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Herrera’s claims rely on treaties, statutes, and precedents. These
sources of law are susceptible to conflicting interpretations and
resolving these conflicts is essential to determining whether the Crow
Tribe has a right to hunt on the disputed land. To understand the roles
these sources play in this dispute it helps to consider the origin and
text of each.
A. The Second Treaty of Fort Laramie
In May 1868, the Crow Tribe and the United States signed the
Second Treaty of Fort Laramie (Crow Treaty).16 The Crow Treaty
established the Crow Reservation in present-day Montana.17 In
exchange, the Tribe ceded the remainder of its land to the United
States.18 The Crow Treaty provided, however, that the Tribe would
retain certain rights in the ceded land.19 Specifically, the Crow Treaty
stated that the Tribe “shall have the right to hunt on unoccupied lands
of the United States so long as game may be found thereon, and as
long as peace subsists among the whites and Indians on the borders of
the hunting districts.”20
B. Wyoming’s Statehood
In 1890, Congress formally admitted Wyoming to the Union “on
an equal footing with the original States in all respects whatever.”21
The Statehood Act granted to Wyoming only those public lands
expressly provided for therein.22 The Act did not mention the Crow
Treaty.23
C. Forest Reserve Act & Bighorn National Forest
In 1891, Congress enacted the Forest Reserve Act, which
authorized the President to “set apart and reserve” certain tracts of
16. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Crow Tribe of Indians, USCrow, May 7, 1868, 15 Stat. 649 [hereinafter Crow Treaty].
17. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 547–48 (1981) (describing how the Crow
Treaty provided for the establishment of the Crow Reservation).
18. See Crow Treaty, art. IV (“The Indians . . . will make said reservation their permanent
home, and they will make no permanent settlement elsewhere.”).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Wyo. Act of Admission, ch. 664, § 1, 26 Stat. 222 (1890) [hereinafter Statehood Act].
22. See id. at § 12 (“The state of Wyoming shall not be entitled to any further or other
grants of land for any purpose than as expressly provided in this act.”).
23. See generally id.
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public lands as “public reservations.”24 The Forest Reserve Act
provides:
“[N]othing in this act shall change, repeal, or modify any
agreements or treaties made with any Indian tribes for the disposal
of their lands, or of land ceded to the United States to be disposed
of for the benefit of such tribes . . . and the disposition of such
lands shall continue in accordance with the provisions of such
treaties or agreements.”25

In 1897, President Grover Cleveland exercised his authority under
the Forest Reserve Act in issuing a proclamation that established the
“Big Horn Forest Reserve” (Bighorn) in northern Wyoming.26 The
land on which this forest was later established was located within the
tract of land that the Crow Tribe ceded in the Treaty.27
D. Race Horse, Repsis, and Mille Lacs
In Ward v. Race Horse,28 the United States Supreme Court
considered a treaty between the United States and the Bannack
Indians that contained a provision identical to a provision of the Crow
Treaty.29 The Court noted a conflict between the Bannack’s treaty
hunting right and the equal footing doctrine, which mandates that
Wyoming have the same ability to regulate hunting within its borders
as any of the other states existing at the time Wyoming was created.30
In resolving the conflict, the Court determined that the Bannack’s
treaty hunting right was a “temporary and precarious” right,
terminated when Wyoming became a state.31 The Court reasoned that
the right was temporary because Congress had the power to
unilaterally terminate it by selling the land.32

24. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, § 24, 26 Stat. 1103, as amended, 16 U.S.C. § 471 (repealed 1976).
25. See id. at § 10.
26. Presidential Proclamation No. 30, 29 Stat. 909 (Feb. 22, 1897). The forest’s name was
changed from “Big Horn” to “Bighorn” in 1908. See The National Forests of the United States,
FOREST HISTORY SOCIETY, https://foresthistory.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/NationalForests-of-the-U.S.pdf.
27. Crow Tribe of Indians v. Repsis, 73 F.3d 982, 985 (10th Cir., 1995).
28. Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896).
29. See Treaty Between the United States of America and the Eastern Band of
Shoshonees and the Bannack Tribe of Indians, art. IV, July 3, 1868, 15 Stat. 674–75, (the Treaty
reserved for the Bannack Tribe the right to hunt on the “unoccupied lands of the United
States”).
30. Race Horse, 163 U.S. at 514–15.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 510.
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Nearly a century after Race Horse was decided, a Crow tribal
member was charged and convicted for hunting in Bighorn in Crow
Tribe of Indians v. Repsis.33 The Crow Tribe disputed the district
court’s finding that Race Horse foreclosed the Tribe’s hunting right.34
The Crow Tribe argued that the Supreme Court had since rejected
several of the legal doctrines applied in Race Horse.35 The Tenth
Circuit disagreed, concluding that Race Horse remained “compelling,
well-reasoned, and persuasive.”36 The Tenth Circuit issued an
“alternative basis for affirmance” to buttress its decision.37 According
to the court, the Crow Tribe’s hunting right was abrogated when “the
creation of the Big Horn National Forest resulted in the ‘occupation’
of the land [that they had ceded].”38
Four years later in 1999, the Supreme Court revisited the Race
Horse doctrine in Minnesota v. Mille Lacs.39 Unlike in Race Horse, the
Court concluded that Minnesota’s admission to the Union did not
terminate the Indian treaty rights at issue.40 The Court explained that
it had “consistently rejected” the “conclusion undergirding the Race
Horse Court’s equal footing holding.”41 The Court subsequently
declared, “because treaty rights are reconcilable with state
sovereignty . . . statehood by itself is insufficient to extinguish Indian
treaty rights to hunt, fish, and gather on land within state
boundaries.”42
Despite repudiating the equal footing doctrine, the Court still
preserved the outcome of Race Horse, determining that it contained
an “alternative holding” that remains good law.43 The Court found
that the analysis under Race Horse requires determining “whether
Congress . . . intended the rights secured by the . . . [t]reaty to survive
statehood.”44 The Court distinguished the treaty in Race Horse from
33. Crow Tribe of Indians v. Repsis, 73 F.3d 982 (10th Cir., 1995).
34. Id. at 986.
35. See id. at 988 (included among the Race Horse legal doctrines that the Tribe argues the
Supreme Court has altered are: state plenary control over game, the equal footing doctrine,
treaty construction, and reconciliation of state regulatory authority and Indian off-reservation
hunting rights).
36. Id. at 994.
37. Id. at 993.
38. Id.
39. Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 203–08 (1999).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 205.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 207.
44. Id.
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that in Mille Lacs by highlighting how only the former tied the
“duration of the rights to the occurrence of some clearly
contemplated event.”45 The Court concluded that unlike the one in
Mille Lacs, the treaty in Race Horse thus clearly demonstrated
Congress’s intent for the tribe’s hunting rights to expire upon
statehood.46
III. HOLDING
The Wyoming District Court upheld Herrera’s conviction.47 The
court found that Repsis, involving similar facts and legal arguments,
precluded Herrera’s arguments.48 Herrera had argued that Mille Lacs
called for an exception to issue preclusion because it “constitute[d] an
intervening change in the applicable legal context.”49 Although the
court recognized this as a legitimate exception to the doctrine, it
rejected its application because “the legal framework [was]
unchanged.”50 Finally, the court decided it was proper to deem the
treaty right terminated even if issue preclusion was inapplicable.51
According to the court, Wyoming’s statehood and the creation of
Bighorn, which resulted in the land’s occupation, abrogated the Crow
Tribe’s hunting right. This is significant because the Treaty only
provided a right to hunt on “unoccupied lands” and therefore no
longer applied to Bighorn.52
IV. ARGUMENTS
A. Petitioner’s Arguments
1. The Crow Tribe Still Have a Hunting Right in Bighorn
Herrera argues that his hunting right under the Crow Treaty has
not been abrogated.53 According to Herrera, the parties did not
45. Id. at 207–08.
46. Id.
47. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 7, at *16.
48. See id. (noting the court’s conclusions that (1) the issue here was identical to the one
decided in Repsis; (2) the finding that the treaty hunting right was temporary in Repsis was
necessary to that judgment; (3) Herrera was in privity with one of the parties in Repsis—the
Crow Tribe; and (4) the Crow Tribe had a full and fair opportunity to litigate in Repsis).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at *16–17.
52. See Crow Treaty, art. IV, supra note 16 (stating that the Crow Tribe “shall have the
right to hunt on unoccupied lands of the United States”) (emphasis added).
53. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 7, at *22–45.
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contemplate Wyoming’s statehood terminating the hunting right
because such an event was not included in the Crow Treaty’s list of
events that could extinguish the right.54 Herrera notes that Mille Lacs
repudiated the concept of statehood’s impliedly terminating Indian
rights.55
The Crow Treaty did contemplate “the lands becom[ing]
occupied.”56 Herrera argues that both parties understood “occupied”
to be synonymous with “settled” because the Crow Treaty has
elements linking the two terms.57 For example, the Crow Treaty
provides for tribal occupation of the land by simultaneously declaring
that others could not “settle upon” the land.58
Herrera further argues that the use of the phrase “settlement” in
President Cleveland’s proclamation illustrates that the land was not
then and is not now occupied.59 Herrera cites contemporaneous
dictionary definitions of the terms “occupy” and “settle” to show that
the Tribe and the United States government understood the terms to
be synonymous.60 Since the proclamation barred “entry or
settlement,” it follows that the proclamation, according to the parties’
understandings of its terms, barred occupation and thus classified the
land as unoccupied.61
2. Issue Preclusion Does Not Bar Herrera From Addressing the
Hunting Right’s Validity
Herrera next claims that issue preclusion does not bar his claim
because Mille Lacs represented a change from Repsis of the
applicable legal context.62 Herrera illustrates both how Repsis relied

54. See id. at *24 (“Wyoming’s statehood is conspicuously absent from that list.”).
55. See id. at *28 (quoting Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S.
172, 205 (1999)) (“[S]tatehood by itself is insufficient to extinguish Indian treaty rights to hunt,
fish, and gather on land within state boundaries.”).
56. Crow Treaty, art. IV, supra note 16.
57. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 7, at *33–34 (citing Washington v. Wash. St. Com.
Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 675 (1979)) (arguing that the Indians’ limited
command of English lends weight to the conclusion that they understood the terms to be
synonymous).
58. See id. at *33 (quoting Crow Treaty, art. II, supra note 16).
59. Id. at *36–37.
60. Id. at *36.
61. See id. at *37 (“[I]t is difficult to imagine how the proclamation could have rendered
the land any more unoccupied than by prohibiting anyone from ‘enter[ing] or mak[ing]
settlement upon’ it.”) (alterations in original).
62. Id. at *47–48.
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heavily on Race Horse63 and how the reasoning of Race Horse was
subsequently repudiated in Mille Lacs.64 According to Herrera, the
Supreme Court’s repudiation of Race Horse qualifies as a mere
change in the legal context.65
Herrera responds to Wyoming’s contention that he is bound by
the conclusion in Repsis that Bighorn is occupied by emphasizing that
this was only an “alternative basis for affirmance” and therefore
should not be entitled to preclusive effect.66 First, the Restatement
(Second) of Judgments67 provides that “a judgment [that] . . . is based
on determinations of two issues . . . is not conclusive with respect to
either issue.”68 Second, the Crow Tribe lacked a full and fair
opportunity to litigate whether Bighorn was “occupied” because, inter
alia, the state did not address this issue in its opening brief.69
B. Respondent’s Arguments
1. Repsis Precludes Herrera From Asserting a Hunting Right
Wyoming argues that all three elements of issue preclusion are
met in this case.70 First, the matter was actually and necessarily
determined.71 Second, neither party disputes that federal courts are of
competent jurisdiction for interpreting Indian treaties.72 Third,
Herrera’s membership in the Crow Tribe binds him to the Repsis
63. See id. at *47 (citing Crow Tribe of Indians v. Repsis, 73 F.3d 982, 994 (10th Cir.,
1995).)) (noting the Tenth Circuit’s description of Race Horse as “compelling, well-reasoned,
and persuasive”).
64. See id. at *48 (citing Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172,
219 (1999)) (noting how Justice Rehnquist, writing in dissent, described Mille Lacs as a decision
that “effectively overruled” Race Horse).
65. Id. (citing Comm’r v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 599 (1948)).
66. See id. at *49 (citing Repsis, 73 F.3d at 993) (“[I]t bears noting that the Wyoming
District Court did not base its issue preclusion ruling on that ground, which is hardly surprising
given that the state made no such argument before it.”).
67. A source that Herrera notes the Supreme Court routinely consults; see id. at *50 (citing
various cases supporting this proposition).
68. Id. at *50 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. i (1982)).
69. See id. at *52 (describing how the state offered no argument about the “occupation” of
Bighorn in the Repsis district court and how the Repsis district court did not address the
question either).
70. See Brief for Respondent at 23, Herrera v. Wyoming, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (2018) (NO. 17532), 2018 WL 6012360, at *23 (quoting Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979))
(“[O]nce an issue is [1] actually and necessarily determined [2] by a court of competent
jurisdiction, that determination is conclusive in subsequent suits based on a different cause of
action involving [3] a party to the prior litigation.”).
71. See id. (explaining that Repsis actually resolved that Crow tribal members are subject
to Wyoming law and that it necessarily did so because the Tribe’s Complaint initiated the case).
72. Id.
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interpretation of the Crow Treaty.73
Next, Wyoming questions the notion that Mille Lacs represents a
change in the legal context from Repsis.74 Wyoming interprets Mille
Lacs to stand for the proposition that statehood does not
automatically extinguish tribal hunting rights.75 The Mille Lacs
holding therefore does not, according to Wyoming, represent a total
repudiation of Race Horse.76 Instead, Mille Lacs preserves the
“narrow alternative holding” of Race Horse, which was that the
specific treaty rights at issue in that case did expire upon statehood.77
Since the treaty provision in this case is identical to the one in Race
Horse, the applicable legal context has not changed.78
In responding to Herrera’s issue preclusion argument, Wyoming
questions the Restatement’s approach to issue preclusion altogether.79
Wyoming asserts that the Supreme Court’s approach to issue
preclusion has been much narrower than the approach called for by
the Restatement.80 Adopting a broader understanding of the
exception, Wyoming argues, would undermine judicial finality.81
Wyoming further contends that Herrera is precluded from
challenging the Tenth Circuit’s conclusion that Bighorn is occupied.82
First, in addressing Herrera’s attempt to undermine the “alternative
holding” of Repsis, Wyoming argues that an alternative holding is as
valid as any other.83 Second, Wyoming characterizes the Tenth
Circuit’s conclusion as a reason underlying the decision rather than as
an “alternative holding.”84

73. See id. at *23–24 (concluding that Herrera’s membership in the Crow Tribe binds him
to the Repsis decision).
74. Id. at *25–34.
75. Id. at *28.
76. See id. (stating that “the Race Horse decision survived Mille Lacs”).
77. Id.
78. See id. at *29 (arguing that Race Horse “has direct application for . . . the Treaty with
the Crows”).
79. See id. at *30 (“[T]he Court should not enshrine the Restatement’s approach here.”).
80. Id. at *31.
81. Id. at *33–34.
82. Id. at *36–38.
83. See id. at *37 (quoting United States v. Title Ins. & Tr. Co., 265 U.S. 472, 486 (1924))
(“[W]here there are two grounds . . . each is the judgment of the court and of equal validity with
the other.” (alteration in original)).
84. See id. at *37–38 (stating that Herrera’s argument conflates the Repsis judgment with
its reasoning and determining that the Tenth Circuit’s conclusion about the forest’s being
occupied was an explanation for the ruling rather than a separate judgment).
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2. The Crow Treaty Does Not Grant a Permanent Right to Hunt
in Bighorn
Next, Wyoming argues that the Crow Treaty only granted the
Crow Tribe the right to hunt until non-Indians began to occupy the
land ceded in the Treaty.85 The Crow Treaty’s use of the term “hunting
districts,” Wyoming contends, provides strong evidence that the right
was intended to be only temporary.86 The contemporary context of the
government’s reservation policy and the imminent westward
expansion of non-Indians support the inference that both parties
understood the temporary nature of the right.87
Wyoming strengthens its argument by emphasizing that the
Supreme Court already examined Congress’s intent with respect to
the Crow Treaty in Race Horse.88 Honoring the doctrine of stare
decisis would require sustaining the Court’s original interpretation.89
V. ANALYSIS
Neither Race Horse nor Repsis should preclude Herrera’s claims
because of the flawed reasoning underlying both decisions. The
Supreme Court has declared that a “change in the applicable legal
context” may suffice to defeat issue preclusion.90 In Bobby v. Bies, the
Supreme Court unanimously concluded that a legal development that
merely altered a party’s litigation strategy was enough to defeat issue
preclusion.91 Here, the relevant legal development was a repudiation
of the entire foundation of the precedent at issue. The contrast
between the Tenth Circuit’s describing Race Horse as “compelling,
well-reasoned, and persuasive”92 and the Supreme Court’s stating that
“Race Horse rested on a false premise”93 is stark. Given this
significant legal development, Herrera’s claims should not be
precluded.
85. Id. at *40.
86. See id. at *43 (“The hunting districts were wilderness that had not yet seen the march
of advancing civilization.”) (internal quotations omitted).
87. See id. at *44 (contending that the very purpose of the Crow Treaty was to mandate a
separation between Indians and incoming non-Indians).
88. See id. at *53 (arguing that “Wyoming and its citizens have relied on the interpretation
from Race Horse for 122 years”).
89. Id.
90. Bobby v. Bies, 556 U.S. 825, 834 (2009) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 28 cmt. c)).
91. Id. at 836–37.
92. Crow Tribe of Indians v. Repsis, 73 F.3d 982, 994 (10th Cir., 1995).
93. Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 204 (1999).
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The prominence of “alternative holdings” in Race Horse and
Repsis further weakens their precedential value in this case. First, the
Supreme Court’s choice not to overturn Race Horse while repudiating
its foundation created the confusion that currently surrounds the
doctrine. One problem with the Court’s decision to preserve the
“alternative holding”94 of Race Horse is that it neglects the way in
which this holding was informed by the since-repudiated equal
footing doctrine.
Underlying the Court’s decision in Race Horse was the
assumption that Congress would not enter into a treaty that might
hamper the autonomy of a future state.95 Since the lands ceded by the
Crow Tribe would eventually be engulfed by a newly formed state, the
parties must have known that the right to hunt on that land would
expire upon statehood.96 To presume otherwise would “render
necessary the assumption that congress [sic] . . . created a provision . . .
irreconcilably in conflict with the powers of the states.”97 This line of
reasoning led to the Court’s inference in Race Horse that the hunting
right was “temporary and precarious,”98 an inference that was
subsequently rejected in Mille Lacs.99 The outdated equal footing
doctrine substantially influenced the “alternative holding” of Race
Horse.
The Tenth Circuit’s “alternative basis for affirmance” in Repsis
also played a substantial role in the outcome of that dispute.100 The
limited support the Tenth Circuit provided for concluding that
Bighorn was occupied, thus abrogating the hunting right,101
demonstrates that the alternative holding in Repsis should not
preclude Herrera’s claims. Further reasons for deciding against issue
preclusion include the state’s initially not offering any argument
about this issue in the lower court102 and the Tenth Circuit’s

94. Id. at 206.
95. Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504, 509 (1896).
96. Id. at 508–10.
97. Id. at 509.
98. Id. at 510, 515.
99. See Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 206–07 (1999)
(“[T]he ‘temporary and precarious’ language in Race Horse is too broad to be useful in
distinguishing rights that survive statehood from those that do not.”).
100. See Crow Tribe of Indians v. Repsis, 73 F.3d 982, 993 (10th Cir., 1995).
101. See id. (noting that the creation of Bighorn National Forest resulted in the
“occupation” of the land because “these lands were no longer available for settlement”).
102. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 7, at *52.
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determination not being subject to plenary appellate review.103
Allowing a decision based on a limited analysis to serve as the basis
for issue preclusion would be inconsistent with a key premise of the
preclusion doctrine: “an underlying confidence that the result
achieved in the initial litigation was substantially correct.”104 Only
well-reasoned conclusions should be determinative in resolving future
similar disputes.
Even though Race Horse and Repsis squarely apply to the issues
in this case, they should not dictate the outcome here. Wyoming’s
attempt to rely on precedent is based, in part, on appealing to the
Supreme Court’s characterization of honoring stare decisis as “a
foundation stone of the rule of law.”105 The stare decisis doctrine
embraces the theory that it is often “more important that the
applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.”106
It is important to recognize, however, that adhering to stare decisis
“is not an inexorable command.”107 In 2018, the Supreme Court
articulated five factors that should be considered when deciding
whether a precedent should dictate the outcome of a future case.108
The first (and perhaps most important) factor is the quality of the
applicable precedent’s reasoning.109 The extent to which the Supreme
Court disparaged the reasoning of Race Horse in Mille Lacs
demonstrates that honoring stare decisis does not mandate concluding
that Race Horse determines the outcome of this case. The minimal
rationale supporting the alternative holding in Repsis indicates that
said holding should not command the outcome here.
CONCLUSION
Examining this case on the merits is necessary in light of the
substantial legal developments that have occurred since the last
dispute involving the Crow Tribe’s treaty right nearly twenty-five
years ago. The Supreme Court’s decision in Mille Lacs to partially

103. Id. at *51.
104. Bravo-Fernandez v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 352, 358 (2016) (quoting Standefer v.
United States, 447 U.S. 10, 23, n. 18 (1980)).
105. Michigan v. Bay Mills, 572 U.S. 782, 798 (2014).
106. Kimble v. Marvel, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015) (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil
& Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
107. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 809 (1991).
108. See Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Mun. Employees, Council 31,
et al., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2478–79 (2018) (listing the five factors).
109. Id.
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preserve the Race Horse holding while repudiating its reasoning
warrants a full reconsideration of the doctrine. Herrera v. Wyoming
provides an opportunity for the Court to clarify its framework for
resolving conflicts between Native American treaty rights and state
sovereignty.

